Hack v. president and fellows of yale college

Regan , F. Given the serious nature of their religious-discrimination claims, the students must be given an opportunity to develop probative facts by the discovery process and to present them to the District Court.

The students alleged that Yale's mandatory co-educational residence rules violate the Fair Housing Act. The District Court, however, asserted that the students lacked Article III "standing to bring their fair-housing claims" because "[t]he plaintiffs were not denied housing or discriminated against by the terms or conditions of Yale's housing policy. This holding confused the question of "standing" with the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, which the District Court prematurely decided.

The Fair Housing Act provides that "it shall be unlawful to refuse to sell or rent. The Act also prohibits discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of. The students have alleged that by refusing to honor their religion-based requests for single-sex housing Yale has in effect refused to make a dwelling available and has discriminated against the plaintiffs "because of.

Section a "reaches every practice which has the effect of making housing more difficult to obtain on prohibited grounds. City of Parma, Ohio , F. Ohio emphasis added. This Court observed, in LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher , 67 F. There was, as in this case, no allegation in LeBlanc that Jews were not permitted to buy property or to live in Airmont.

However, it was established that it was "important for Orthodox Jews to be able to gather for worship in congregations large enough to ensure the presence of a minyan , and close enough to the congregants' homes to allow them to walk to services. The Village of Airmont's zoning regulations made it more difficult for Orthodox Jews to comply with their obligations and therefore had the effect of excluding Orthodox Jews from the community.

This Court held that the District Court in LeBlanc erred in setting aside the jury's verdict against the Village, because "the evidence was sufficient to establish that Airmont violated the private plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act.

Yale's insistence that it will only provide housing that it knows the students cannot occupy, and its refusal to make available to the students housing that the students can occupy despite the fact that such housing exists and that Yale does provide it to other students , has, like the zoning regulations enacted by the Village of Airmont, "made unavailable" and constructively denied housing to the students because of religion.

If, for example, a dormitory rule made it impermissible for all students to wear a yarmulke in a dormitory room, or prohibited all students from keeping a prayer shawl " tallit " , phylacteries " tefillin " , or a prayerbook " siddur " in his or her room, such regulations would, in practical effect, exclude Orthodox Jews from the dormitories. The current rules or, more precisely, the current absence of any traditional, reasonable parietal rules have the same effect on the plaintiffs.

This discrimination is actionable under Section a. Section b makes it "unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,. Therefore, Yale's policy of granting ad hoc and other exemptions and accommodations for secular reasons, but not for religious reasons, is also actionable under Section b.

The United States Supreme Court has made clear that it is discrimination to treat religion-based requests for exemptions differently than other requests: "[W]here the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason.

Smith , U. Roy , U. Hialeah , U. Yale will likely insist that its on-campus housing requirement is both neutral and generally applicable and that it has not discriminated against the students either on paper or in practice. But this is certainly a disputed question of fact that should not have been resolved by the District Court on a motion to dismiss.

Field , F. In sum, the students' allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief under the Fair Housing Act, especially given that the United States Supreme Court has called for a "generous construction" of the Act in light of its important purposes. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' Fair Housing claim because, it said, the plaintiffs lacked "standing" to sue.

The Court asserted that the Amended Complaint had "set forth no factual allegations that satisfy the injury-in-fact element" Op. This conclusion plainly misapprehends the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs are not arguing that they have been barred from occupying the rooms assigned to them. But they do contend that, by reason of Yale's dormitory policies, the rooms are effectively unavailable to them.

Yale's dormitory policies have the effect of excluding these devoutly observant Orthodox Jews because of their religion. The law is clear that a plaintiff can establish illegal discrimination under the Fair Housing Act by proving either disparate treatment or disparate impact. Incorporated Village of Island Park , F. Town of Huntington , F. The District Court ruled erroneously that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their claims lacked merit.

A party's standing to bring a claim in federal court does not depend on the merits of his claims. The question under Article III is not whether a plaintiff can prevail, but whether that plaintiff has the "requisite. Board of Education , U. Village of Bellwood , U. Coleman , U.

Cisneros , 37 F. As the Trafficante Court noted, the Act's language is "broad and inclusive" U. Any "aggrieved person" may commence a civil action in an appropriate court under the Fair Housing Act. An "aggrieved person" is defined broadly in Section i 1 as anyone who "claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice. The students have suffered concrete economic injury as a result of Yale's Fair Housing Act violations. They have been forced to pay for on-campus housing that they have not used, cannot use, never will use, and that Yale knows is useless to them.

This kind of tangible and concrete financial harm -- in addition to less tangible but no-less-real harm they have suffered by being denied the chance to participate fully in undergraduate life -- is routinely found sufficient to confer standing in Fair Housing Act cases.

Chanticleer Condominium Assoc. The students alleged two federal antitrust claims that were precipitously and erroneously dismissed by the District Court. The first claim was that Yale's requirement that freshmen and sophomores reside in the dormitories was an attempt by Yale to monopolize the New Haven student-housing market. The second antitrust claim was that the requirement was an illegal "tying arrangement" because the provision of a Yale education was made conditional on the purchase by the students of "unrelated housing services.

The District Court faulted the plaintiffs' complaint for failing to meet their "burden of defining the relevant market. Domino's Pizza, Inc. Relying on Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc. The plaintiffs recognized, however, that a monopolization claim must define a relevant market "with reference to the rule of reasonable interchangeability and cross elasticity of demand.

The Coca-Cola Co. And their proposed market -- student housing in New Haven -- did "encompass all interchangeable substitute products. Image Technical Servs.

The "relevant market" alleged in this case includes interchangeable substitute products. It is a fact of life that not all dwelling space in New Haven is interchangeable with "student housing.

Similarly, were the rent for traditional student housing -- on campus and off -- to drop precipitously, there would be no rush for dingy academic digs by the Connecticut gentry. Because of Yale's monopolistic policy, many consumers are prevented from responding to price changes within the relevant market. An unmarried Yale sophomore is not permitted to "substitute" a third-floor apartment on Orange Street in New Haven for a dormitory room, even if the former is available at a much better price.

Despite the fact that these two goods are interchangeable and are part of the same "relevant market," consumers' rational behavior is thwarted. This is precisely the vice of monopoly that the Sherman Act was intended to remedy. Hamilton College , F. This Court's recent decision in Hamilton Chapter highlights two important errors in the District Court's opinion in this case.

First , the District Court erred by requiring the students to prove their case, without any discovery, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed. It is well established that "market definition is most often a factual inquiry. American Tel. For this reason, a "generous approach to pleading applies in the antitrust context. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will or might ultimately prevail on her claim, but whether she is entitled to offer evidence in support of the allegations in the complaint.

A dismissal is warranted under Rule 12 b 6 only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.

Second, the District Court asserted that "the amended complaint's allegation that the relevant market is housing for Yale students fails to include all interchangeable substitutes. The plaintiffs could have opted to attend a different college or university if they were not satisfied with Yale's housing policy.

This conclusion is similar to the argument advanced by the defendant in Hamilton , F. In Hamilton , however, several fraternities had alleged that Hamilton College's residential policy, which requires all of its students to live in college housing and participate in a college meal plan, "unlawfully monopolizes the market for residential services in Clinton, New York.

The same legislation, titled "An Act for the Encouragement of Yale College," provided for the admission and graduation of certain scholars and for the transfer of books from the College's earlier home in Saybrook to New Haven. In October , the General Assembly of Connecticut enacted a law directing that all proceeds of "the impost on rum for two years next" were to be applied to building the rector's house at Yale College.

Yale College professors, tutors, students and their servants were also "freed and exempted" from taxes, military service and other public services such as "working at highways. In May , the General Assembly granted Yale College the right to hold a lottery to raise money for a new residence hall. In October , the General Assembly voted to grant to Yale the proceeds of the sale of a French boat captured by the Colony's frigate.

These public funds, which were later supplemented with other public funds -- a total of pounds sterling -- were used to construct Connecticut Hall, which contained "sleeping chambers" for students at the College. After the Revolution and the establishment of the State of Connecticut, the Connecticut Legislature enacted the Act of Union in , which revised Yale's charter.

The Act of Union provided that the State of Connecticut would give substantial financial assistance to Yale College. The Act of Union prescribed that the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and six senior assistants in the Connecticut Council were to serve as ex officio members of the Yale Corporation.

With the government funds provided under the Act of Union, a new dormitory building named Union Hall was constructed beginning with April The building was named Union Hall because of the "amicable union" between the government of the State of Connecticut and the private officials of Yale College.

In May , the Connecticut General Assembly voted additional financial support to Yale College and required the president and fellows of Yale College to make an annual account of receipts and expenditures to the General Assembly.

The legal requirement of an annual report of Yale's receipts and expenditures to the Connecticut General Assembly continues to this day. Article 8 pertains in its entirety to the public educational institutions of Connecticut.

Yale is the only school specified in the Connecticut Constitution of , and its inclusion in this form bars any legislative modification or change in Yale's charter. By confirming the charter of Yale College in its Constitution, the State of Connecticut has established Yale as an official state institution subject to the obligations imposed by the Constitution of the United States and by the Constitution of the State of Connecticut on all agencies of government.

On May 12, , the Connecticut Legislature amended the Act of Union by providing that six senior senators of the Connecticut Legislature, sit, ex officio , as members of the Yale Corporation in addition to the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the State of Connecticut. The Connecticut Legislature continued to provide special financial benefits to Yale.

As a consequence of this special legislation several new buildings were constructed on the Yale campus. In , the Connecticut General Assembly substituted six elected alumni for the six Connecticut senators who are to sit on Yale's board. In , the tax exemption that had earlier been granted to Yale was reconfirmed, and it was extended to Trinity College and Wesleyan University.

Yale has continued to benefit from acts of the Connecticut General assembly until today. The State of Connecticut reimburses the City of New Haven for a substantial portion of the City's lost revenues from Yale's tax-exempt property.

Yale College has twelve "Residential Colleges. Yale has no parietal rules a regarding visits at any time of the day or night by members of the opposite sex and b regarding sexual activity in its dormitories.

Yale's "Dormitory Regulations" state, in part: "All Freshmen and Sophomores are required to live on campus, except Freshmen who are married or who are over 21 years of age. Before it did not apply to students whose families lived in New Haven. Orthodox Judaism regulates the details of daily life according to religious law and tradition. Among other things, Orthodox Judaism requires strict adherence to a code of sexual modesty which forbids, for example, touching members of the opposite sex other than one's immediate relatives or spouse.

It also forbids living in a situation in which a person would have regular or repeated exposure to members of the opposite sex undressed or dressed immodestly. She deferred her enrollment for one year in order to study Jewish religious subjects at Michlala, an all-women's college in Jerusalem. Her intention in such study was to strengthen her commitment to her faith and to gain a deeper understanding of her religious obligations. In April , before her freshman year began, Ms. Friedman wrote to defendant Trachtenberg to request a waiver from Yale's housing regulation requiring freshmen to live in on-campus dormitories.

In her letter, Ms. Friedman pointed out to Dean Trachtenberg that Yale's co-educational dormitories were unacceptable under the laws of Orthodox Judaism. Friedman summarized in her letter her religion-based concerns about on-campus housing, emphasizing the accessibility of dormitory halls and bathrooms to members of the opposite sex.

Such an environment, she explained, was in direct conflict with the tenets of Orthodox Judaism, which forbids unnecessary interaction between unmarried men and women. Friedman stated that she "fully appreciate[d] the college's standpoint in promoting a diverse atmosphere on campus and advancing interaction between all classmates" and "hope[d] to partake in [Yale's] friendly and multi-cultural environment in various other forums" but insisted that she "[would] not compromise [her] religious standards.

On May 13, , Dean Trachtenberg denied Ms. Friedman's request for a waiver, citing Yale's policy requiring incoming freshmen to purchase housing in on-campus residential colleges. Although Dean Trachtenberg noted that Yale will "continue [the] practice" of working with students "to accommodate their religious practices," she did not deem Ms.

Friedman's own sincere religious practices to be a sufficient reason to depart from Yale's housing regulations. On information and belief, this decision was approved by defendant Brodhead. Under threat of being excluded from Yale, Ms. Friedman paid the separate charge for on-campus housing when she paid her tuition bill. Nonetheless, in keeping with her own religious obligations, Ms. Friedman rented housing off-campus, which was readily available in the New Haven housing market, where she lived during the academic year.

He deferred enrollment for two years to engage in religious studies. On May 9, , Mr. Hack requested a waiver from Yale's on-campus housing requirement, citing religious concerns similar to those expressed by the other plaintiffs. Barnette, U. In a long line of cases, most noteworthy of which is Abood v.

Detroit Board of Education , U. While Abood and its progeny have involved the member-funded activities of labor unions and integrated state bar associations, it is clear that the principles outlined in those cases apply in the context of a university as well.

See Carroll, F. Rutgers, F. Yale repeatedly asserts that "there is no particular ideological organization or ideology which plaintiffs would be compelled to join, associate with or support. This assertion simply demonstrates that Yale misunderstands the plaintiffs' compelled-expressive-association claim. We are not seeking to prevent Yale from tolerating a "full range of political and social views.

Nor do the plaintiffs object to "encountering" sexual immodesty or associating with students whose beliefs they find offensive and wrong. Rather, the plaintiffs assert that they are being forced by Yale to engage in expressive association by sleeping, bathing, and living in the co-educational, rule-less dormitories that Yale claims best serve its own educational "philosophy.

The plaintiffs believe, as a matter of religious faith and obligation, that it is wrong for unmarried people of the opposite sex to live, sleep, dress, and bathe together in the manner Yale requires of its students.

This belief is, of course, protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, Yale acknowledges, as it must, that the First Amendment forbids compelled expression with which one disagrees.

At the same time, Yale admits that its housing policy is part and parcel of its educational philosophy about how best to mold and change its students' minds. See Yale Memo, p. The plaintiffs contend that Yale's mandatory co-educational housing policy advances and is part of a "politically correct" ideology of sexual permissiveness and moral relativism, a secular orthodoxy that is both hostile and dismissive of traditional and especially religious values, beliefs, and obligations.

By requiring the plaintiffs to pay for rooms in Yale's co-educational dormitories and to sleep in those rooms, Yale has gone beyond compelling the plaintiffs to meet and "encounter" other people with different ideas.

It has compelled the plaintiffs themselves to engage in and financially support expressive and symbolic activity which they find objectionable. Yale's housing policy creates classifications that result in the disparate treatment of similarly situated students. These classifications impose a substantial burden on the students' fundamental rights. We submit that there is no rational basis for the policy's classifications. Nor can Yale justify the policy with a "compelling public interest," as is required under strict-scrutiny analysis.

See, e. Borough of Mahaffey, PA , 35 F. These allegations therefore clearly state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, some courts have upheld university residence rules in the face of equal-protection challenges.

See Yale Memo, pp. The only one of these decisions that binds this Court is Bynes v. Toll , F. In that case, students argued that the State University of New York at Stony Brook was required to let married students with children live in housing designated for married students without children. The court correctly held that the University's "no children" rule was rationally related to the legitimate public interest in child safety.

The rationality of Yale s particular residence rule - especially given the fact that Yale requires co-educational housing - is an open question for this Court. See Cooper v Nix , F. Southeastern Louisiana College , F.

In any event, the mere rationality of Yale's rule would not alone be sufficient to sustain it. The plaintiffs have alleged that Yale's housing policy burdens their fundamental rights, and the policy is therefore subject to "strict scrutiny. The court in Bynes was careful to note that SUNY's "no children" rule did not burden the plaintiffs' fundamental rights, and that "strict-scrutiny" review was therefore not warranted.

Similarly, in Prostrollo , the court refused to apply "strict scrutiny" to the challenged housing rule because "the right to choose one's residence is [not] a fundamental right" and the alleged interference with the "freedom of association" was "too insignificant to invoke strict scrutiny of the statute.

Contrary to Yale's assertion, the plaintiffs do not have to allege, let alone prove, that they have been treated differently from other religious groups in order to invoke "strict scrutiny" review.

Instead, they must allege - as they have - that their fundamental rights are burdened by the classifications contained in Yale's housing policy and by Yale's practice of treating requests for religion-based exemptions less favorably than others. A classification that might otherwise be subject only to rational-basis review - a classification that distinguished between religious groups would certainly not be such a classification - is subject to strict scrutiny when it burdens fundamental rights.

It is the nature of the burden , not the nature of the classification , that triggers strict scrutiny. Yale must therefore demonstrate that its rule requiring residence in co-educational dormitories by all freshmen and sophomores, including those with religious convictions but excepting those over 21 or married, is "narrowly tailored" to advance a "compelling state interest.

The plaintiffs have presented this Court with specific allegations regarding the intrusions upon their personal privacy that Yale's housing policy forces them to endure as a condition of enrollment.

Yale responds by mischaracterizing their claims. We agree that, of course, there is no "fundamental right to live precisely where one chooses. But such a claim is entirely different from the allegation that "[s]tudents who are forced to reside in Yale's co-educational housing are subjected to frequent and repeated invasions of their privacy in their rooms and bathrooms.

They are unable to avoid such invasions. By relying on cases dealing with the disclosure of personal papers such as Nixon v. Administrator of General Services , U. Davis , U. It cannot be doubted that one has a "privacy" interest in preventing intrusions on one's bedroom, bathroom, shower, and toilet. As the Court observed in York v. Story , F. We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body.

The desire to shield one's unclothed figure from the view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity. The Fair Housing Act prohibits, inter alia , discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

The plaintiffs have alleged that by refusing to honor their religion-based requests for single-sex housing, either by exempting them from the on-campus housing requirement or by providing single-sex housing on or off campus, Yale has discriminated against the plaintiffs "because of.

Providing only co-educational housing facilities, which are known to be unacceptable to these students because of their religious beliefs, is a "term" or "condition" of the rental of a dwelling, and is an aspect of the "provision of services or facilities in connection [with a dwelling]," under the Act.

Moreover, Yale's policy of granting ad hoc exemptions and accommodations for secular reasons but not for religious reasons is similarly covered by the Act. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief under the Fair Housing Act, especially given that the United States Supreme Court has called for a "generous construction" of the Act in light of its important purposes. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. The law is clear that a plaintiff can establish illegal discrimination under the Fair Housing Act by proving either disparate treatment or disparate impact.

The Act prohibits all housing policies that have a discriminatory effect. Incorporated Village of Island Park , F. Treating religion-based requests for exemptions differently from other requests is discrimination. The plaintiffs allege that Yale has discriminated against them "because of religion" by requiring students to live in co-educational housing, by treating their religion-based requests for exemptions from co-educational housing differently from other requests, and by exempting students from the on-campus housing requirement for non-religious reasons while refusing to exempt those who have invoked religious reasons.

The facial neutrality of providing co-educational housing to all students does not defeat the plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claim because that kind of housing, in and of itself, violates the students' religious convictions. Badgett , F. East River Housing Corp. Indeed, Yale's discriminatory application of its on-campus housing requirement is a paradigmatic Fair Housing Act violation.

This is true even if Yale were not required, as an initial matter, to "accommodate" the plaintiffs in the same way it would be required to accommodate a physical handicap. Yale does not deny that the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges four elements of a tying-arrangement claim.

It challenges only the claim that Yale has the requisite economic power in the tying product market. Yale contends that allegations regarding the uniqueness of a Yale education and its benefits do not sufficiently allege market power. This argument fails for two reasons: First , whether the uniqueness of a Yale education can supply the required market power is a factual question that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Second , even if "uniqueness" were a question that could be resolved on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged that element. An antitrust claim need not be pleaded with heightened specificity. The plaintiff need only give a "short plain statement of a claim for relief which gives notice to the opposing party.

Frey Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp. A plaintiff making a tying-agreement claim need not assert that the defendant has full-blown monopoly power, or even that he has a dominant position in the tying product market.

The element of economic power can be satisfied simply by alleging that the product is unique. Steel Corp. Fortner Enterprises , U. Whether a tying product is sufficiently unique to create economic power within the meaning of the Act is ordinarily a question of fact, and courts have consistently held that it is inappropriate to resolve such a disputed issue before trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recognized that whether a tying product is sufficiently unique to meet the requirements of a tying claim is a question of fact that should not be determined on a pre-trial dispositive motion.

See Hill v. A-T-O, Inc. In Hill , the Second Circuit reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, noting that a factual question is raised where the plaintiff alleges and offers evidence of uniqueness which the defendant denies. Plaintiffs begin by describing the significant interrelationships between Yale and the state from colonial days well into the latter nineteenth century. To that end they note that Yale is chartered by special legislation and, indeed, that charter is confirmed in the Connecticut Constitution.

They contend that Yale was created to further public, governmental objectives, objectives that are equally valid today. Yale, they point out, must submit its budget and financial report to the Connecticut legislature. Finally, 1 they argue that the presence of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, as ex officio members of the nineteen-member "Fellows of Yale College" governing board, provides further support for the conclusion that Yale is a governmental entity.

In Lebron, the Supreme Court determined that Amtrak was a governmental entity:. We hold that where, as here, the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment.

In the wake of Lebron, other courts have concluded that the Court set forth a three-prong standard:. See Barrios-Velazquez v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 86 F. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. National Pub. Here, the first two factors are easily satisfied: the State of Connecticut created the corporate entity by special law, and higher education is a governmental objective although not the exclusive province of government.

Two of nineteen board members is, however, a long way from control. Plaintiffs contend that a three-prong test, with one prong requiring "majority" governmental control, is an overly simplistic reading of Lebron. They argue that the two highest executive officers of the state are likely to be far more influential than other members, that they carry with them the aura of official action, and that their participation is at least as significant as the Presidential power to appoint a majority of Amtrak board members from specific lists of recommended private sector nominees.

We disagree. We think Lebron means what it says. Indeed, the Court there contrasted Comsat with Amtrak, noting that the President appointed only three of fifteen Comsat directors, U. Moreover, the Court has indicated its reluctance to have the federal courts indulge in evaluations of the effectiveness of governmental persuasion, absent government control. United States Olympic Comm. Plaintiffs do not suggest that Connecticut had any involvement in establishing Yale's parietal rules.

It is equally clear that the state could not control Yale's policies and operations even if it chose to become involved. Yale, as a private university, did not act under color of law.